

NATO, CANADA AND NUCLEAR ARMS

by

JORDAN BISHOP

with an

ADDENDUM

by

Ed Shaffer

A STUDY PRODUCED

for

VETERANS AGAINST NUCLEAR ARMS

by the

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INTRODUCTION

This booklet is divided into parts. The first, and main, part was written by Jordan Bishop after the World Court's (International Court of Justice) landmark decision of July 8, 1996 declaring "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law." Though generally ignored by the media, this decision had worldwide reverberations. In Canada, Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy stated that in view of this finding Canada should review its nuclear weapon's policy¹ In light of this development, the Defence Education and Research Centre, as part of its educational activities, decided to examine Canada's nuclear weapons policy. and its relation to NATO.

After Jordan Bishop completed his examination, it became apparent that NATO was not only ignoring the decision but was also becoming increasingly aggressive in its outlook. D.R.E.C. decided to wait until NATO officially announced its new policies. These changes occurred at its 50th anniversary summit which took place in Washington in April 1999. Ed Shaffer incorporated these changes in the **Addendum** and also updated some sections of Bishop's work.

I want to thank some of the people who helped the authors with their verbal and written comments. They include Marion and Mark Frank of Toronto, Tony Mokry of Edmonton and the Reverend Ron Mosley of Petite Rivière, Nova Scotia. I also want to thank Audrey Tobias of Toronto for her early editing work. These people are, of course, not responsible for any errors or omissions, for which I assume full responsibility.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Jordan Bishop

Jordan Bishop, the principal author, was born in 1926 in Waukegan Township, Illinois. He served in the United States Naval Reserve from 1944 until 1946. From 1946 until 1969 he was a member of the Dominican Order, working in Italy, France and Bolivia, where for twelve years he taught in various post-secondary institutions. On leaving the Dominican Order in 1969 he worked in historical research in Cuernavaca, Mexico. Emigrating to Canada in 1971, he taught at Atkinson College, OISE and The University College of Cape Breton, Sydney, Nova Scotia, from which he retired as professor of Humanities in 1989.

In addition to teaching philosophy and history, Jordan has worked as a farm labourer and in journalism. He has published three books: *Latin America and Revolution* (London, England, 1964) *Les théologiens de la mort de Dieu* (Paris, France, 1967) and *Cristianismo radical y marxismo* (Mexico City, 1970). He worked as an editorial writer for the Cape Breton Post between academic postings and has been a regular contributor to *Commonweal* (New York) for thirty-five years. A Canadian citizen, he is married and has two children. He joined VANA in Nova Scotia in 1985 and is now an active member of VANA-Ottawa.

Ed Shaffer

Ed Shaffer was born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in 1923. He volunteered for U. S. Army 1942 and served in Europe. His unit, the 1263rd Engineer Combat Battalion, crossed the Elbe river in Germany and linked up with the Soviet Army about 65 miles west of Berlin in the final days of World War II. After the war he worked as a taxi driver and as an auto worker in Detroit.

He later obtained a Masters degree in Economics at the University of Michigan. Upon leaving Michigan he became an economic consultant in New York City. A great deal of his work was done for oil companies. Deciding to quit consulting, he enrolled in Columbia University, where he earned a PhD in Economics. He then held teaching positions in the states of Washington and California before coming to Canada in 1970 to accept an appointment at the University of Alberta. While in Alberta, he was a frequent commentator on economic issues on both radio and TV. He retired in 1988 with the title of Professor Emeritus and moved to Vancouver. He is the author of several books: *The Oil Import Program of the United States* (New York, 1968), *The United States and the Control of World Oil* (London, Canberra and New York, 1983) and *Canada's Oil and the American Empire* (Edmonton, 1983). He also has contributed articles to the print media, economic journals and books of readings.

He joined VANA in 1983 and served in several capacities. He is presently the research director of D.R.E.C. He is married, has two children and four grandchildren.

NATO, CANADA AND NUCLEAR ARMS

by
JORDAN BISHOP

Origins of NATO

When NATO was established in 1949 Lord Islay, its first Secretary General, defined its purpose as "keeping the Russians out [of Europe], the Americans in, and the Germans down." Islay's objectives are worth comment. The Americans are in and will no doubt stay in, whether NATO continues or not. The Germans are no longer down, although unification has created some serious problems. The Russians are not only out, but are very uncomfortable with the expansion of NATO eastward. In a word, all that is left of Islay's purpose is to keep the Russians out. This is still very much the case even now, some ten years after the end of the Cold War in 1989.

NATO was a creature of the Cold War and should have died when the Cold War ended. But NATO remains and has expanded to include three former Warsaw Pact nations: Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. To the casual observer this is all very mysterious: why expand an institution that has, some ten years ago, lost its *raison d'être*? This is in effect the conclusion of retired Admiral John T. Shannon, director of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information:

Clinging to a military organization when the principal concerns today are political and economic is unwise and dangerous. NATO should be given a medal and be put to bed.²

This alliance, allegedly created to defend Western Nations against a presumed Soviet attack, has now become its own reason for existence as a large bureaucracy that keeps the arms industry alive and well fed. Why is it that NATO is still with us? All the decisions taken by NATO eight years after the dissolution of the "Soviet Empire" clearly indicate either that the institution is living in the past or that it has always been and still is an instrument of domination.

Several months after the World Court in July 1996 decided that nuclear weapons are illegal except in certain very limited and hypothetical situations, NATO reaffirmed its traditional policy on nuclear weapons, even though it is not clear who is threatening NATO. Nevertheless, NATO plans to continue its expansion.

In January 1994 President Clinton launched the Partnership for Peace programme, which has been billed as a first step toward Russia becoming a member of NATO. Although the Russian Federation has joined the PFP, there is no indication that it would be allowed to join NATO or that it would desire to do so.

There is, on the other hand, every indication that the Russians find any enlargement of NATO to the East quite unacceptable. They insist that at the time of German reunification it was understood that

neither nuclear weapons nor foreign troops would be permitted in the territory of the former German Democratic Republic. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary - the states that were recently admitted to NATO - were given the same assurances.³

NATO's expansion has delayed ratification of START II. Furthermore the Russians, jettisoning the Soviet policy of rejecting the employment of nuclear weapons, have abandoned their "no first use" doctrine. In an interview on a Moscow radio station on May 9, 1997, the former Security Council Deputy Secretary Boris Berezovsky stated:

We are not speaking of making a first nuclear strike in order to secure advantage but if we are driven into a corner and are left with no other option we will resort to nuclear weapons⁴

His statement, reflecting Russia's fear of an attack by the combined NATO forces, who now have larger conventional armies than Russia, is as much a regression to Cold War rhetoric as is NATO itself.⁵ It is a prime example of the Cold War practice -- on both sides -- of using hypothetical -- and often erroneous -- threats of numerical superiority to justify the arms race.

The U.S. military budget has remained fairly constant. The Russian defence budget has been reduced by 45 per cent in four years,⁶ and there are serious questions about the reality of the Russian nuclear capability, which may today be more of an ecological than a military threat.⁷ But this is quite irrelevant. As the late Edward Thompson noted, the threat of nuclear weapons was always more symbolic -- a political threat -- rather than military. And as symbol, the "worst-case scenario" was bread and butter to Cold War thinking.⁸ Nothing less would have enabled the defence establishment to justify the enormous expenses of the arms race.

The question remains, what is the point of NATO in Europe today? It is perhaps useful to recall certain historical data. In the United States, there was great anxiety in the post-1945 period about the danger of falling into another great depression. Many saw the solution in a continuing war economy. The Marshall plan helped to convert much of U.S. industry to peacetime production. However, as this succeeded in rebuilding the economies of Western Europe, its very success destroyed markets, and indeed, created competition for U.S. industry. Stalin's "Peace Offensive," which would have resulted in a neutral, unarmed and united Germany was seen, in certain circles, as an economic threat to the United States.⁹

It was thus seen as imperative that West Germany be locked into the economic bloc dominated by the United States. Since the French had serious misgivings about the rearming of Germany, NATO became a political necessity so that Germany could be rearmed under international control. This was done within five years of the founding of NATO.

There was no doubt at the time that a rearmed Germany would be regarded, by the Russians, as a threat. By this time, however, the Cold War was raging, and the ideological justification for NATO was the alleged Soviet menace. This menace, assumed rather than proven, was related more to

domestic political considerations in the United States than to anything that Moscow did or contemplated doing.¹⁰ It also served as a justification for a “rollback” policy, under the guise of “containment.” This was a policy that the Western Powers pursued in different forms since the Bolshevik Revolution.

It was known in the late forties that Moscow had demobilized to a greater extent than most Americans were told.¹¹ Nevertheless, it was important to the United States that Germany, or a good part of it, be kept in the American orbit. Since the Soviets would not have agreed under any circumstances to the creation of a united Germany which was part of the Western bloc, the division of Germany was inevitable. A neutral Germany, even if dominated by a non-Communist government was unacceptable to the United States.

In 1957, Adam Rapacki, the Polish foreign minister, had proposed a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Central Europe. This was in fact supported by Canada, but was unacceptable to the United States and the United Kingdom, and it was rejected out of hand.

For the Soviets, NATO epitomized the western menace. Despite NATO’s protests of innocence, the Russian fears are quite understandable. Russia was invaded by Germany in 1914 and again in 1941. Attempts to secure an agreement to protect the Soviets against the German threat in the late Thirties came to naught. The French had attempted such an agreement, but the British refused to comply. The Czechs, under extreme pressure from Britain and France, did not accept the support offered by Russia at the time of Munich. After the revolution of 1917, thousands of troops from Japan, England, Canada, and the United States invaded the infant Soviet state. But it was Germany that was most feared, and it was with respect to Germany that the Soviets insisted on creating their own cordon sanitaire, tightening their control over front-line states that were to become the Warsaw Pact, in 1955, six years after the formation of NATO.

NATO Today

NOW, fifty years later, NATO is a power in itself. It used to be said, in the nineteenth century, that while most states had armies, the Prussian army had a state. Today, it could be said that NATO is an army-- or a military institution -- which has fifteen states, even though some of these states also have armies that can, under certain conditions, act independently of NATO.

NATO not only is, in a sense, an army with a number of states, it has nuclear arms -- although these are completely under the control of the United States and the other two Nuclear Weapons States in NATO. And when NATO, in flagrant defiance of the World Court Decision on nuclear weapons, reaffirms "that the nuclear forces of the Allies continue to play a unique and essential role in the Alliance's strategy of war prevention," and that the "fundamental purpose of nuclear weapons is political - to preserve peace and prevent coercion"¹² it also writes off the Non Proliferation Treaty as a symbolic piece of paper to be applied only to third world countries. The commitment to work toward nuclear disarmament is clearly not a part of the NATO agenda. NATO, as it was, is bad

enough. NATO's reaffirmance of its reliance on nuclear weapons has put a spoke in the START II negotiations and pushed the Russian Federation into a renewed reliance on nuclear weapons.¹³

Nuclear Weapons Are Offensive

Official rhetoric notwithstanding, we have reached a point where no serious analyst believes that nuclear weapons are defensive in nature. Even if one assumes, as many now do, that a nuclear weapon is an oxymoron, and that nuclear weapons are useless except as a symbolic means of political intimidation, NATO's nuclear policy is in blatant defiance of the decision of the World Court. It also should not be forgotten that the nuclear powers within NATO did everything in their power to prevent the case being presented to the Court.

Intimidation

In order to justify the continued existence of NATO, there is now talk of some kind of rapid deployment force, which could intervene anywhere to maintain peace, or, as some might put it, to maintain the new colonialism of the developed nations. This project suffers from the same defect as does NATO itself. We have moved beyond the stage where one can seriously expect solutions to international problems through military action alone. The parameters of NATO are too narrowly military to provide a credible response to today's security problems. We had a chance, in 1992, to create a new security structure in Europe, "based on the concept of collective security and using the structures of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to provide a framework for its work."¹⁴ This possibility was in effect excluded by the United States, which wanted an ongoing role for NATO to ensure a strong U.S. presence in Europe.

As it stands now, NATO, a creature of the Cold War, exists not only to intimidate the Russians but also to extend its power to the Middle East and other Third World countries. In other words, it exists to maintain the hegemony of the developed world.

NATO's role today is similar to that of the Holy Alliance, which dominated Europe from the end of the Napoleonic Wars until the revolutionary wave of 1848. Formed in 1815 by the monarchs of Austria, Prussia and Russia, it eventually grew to include every monarchy on the Continent with the exception of England and Turkey. Its role was to prevent another republican movement from arising in France and to crush republican movements wherever they existed.

The Alliance emphasized political goals like "the precepts of Justice, Christian Charity and Peace,"¹⁵ defining these terms in a manner consonant with its interests. Today NATO use terms like "democracy" and "free markets" to justify policies consonant with its interests. In his statement on the NATO-Russian agreement on NATO expansion, President Clinton spoke of an "undivided continent where our values of democracy and human rights, free markets and peace know no boundaries."¹⁶ He also praised an article by President Havel of the Czech Republic, which appeared in the *New York Times* of May 13, 1997. In Havel's words, NATO "is first and foremost an

instrument of democracy intended to defend mutually held and created political and spiritual values. It must see itself not as a pact of nations against a more or less obvious enemy, but as a guarantor of Euro-American civilization and thus as a pillar of global security. "Russia, according to Havel, should not belong to NATO because it is a "Eurasian superpower"¹⁷ and does not have the exalted values of the "Euro-American civilization."

In a vein similar to NATO's intervention in Bosnia, in what was essentially a civil war in Yugoslavia, the Alliance in 1849 sent troops into Hungary to crush a revolution.¹⁸ NATO's expansion into Eastern and Central Europe places it in a position to put in power rulers who will carry out its policies. The possibility of such NATO actions means that Canadian troops may be called upon to risk their lives either to keep in power or to install leaders who, though dubbed "democrats" by the West, are in reality both corrupt and authoritarian

NATO and The NPT

Canada assumed a leadership role in the struggle, on behalf of the United States, to secure an indefinite extension of the Non Proliferation Treaty. A sufficient number of countries signed the document to bring it into force, despite the protests by India and by large segments of the peace movement that the treaty would freeze the status quo and would allow the nuclear weapons states to continue to do business as usual. Though the NPT commits the Nuclear Weapons States to work toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, there are no signs that these states have taken this provision seriously. They steadfastly refuse to entertain any time-bound framework for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

It now appears that India and the other protesters were correct in their conclusions. The START II has been signed, but it suffers from all the limitations of step-by-step consensus negotiation, and will, if fully implemented, only reduce the total number of nuclear weapons to some 13,000. In a word, nuclear arms will remain for the foreseeable future. There are no signs of any serious effort toward total nuclear disarmament by any of the Nuclear Weapons States, with the possible exception of China.

This was, to a great extent, also the fate of the 1963 test ban treaty. It did put a stop to atmospheric testing and the extreme environmental hazards that such testing entailed. It too involved a commitment on the part of Nuclear Weapons States to work toward a Comprehensive Test Ban. The first serious move toward this was taken by M. Gorbachev in the 1980s, in the form of a unilateral moratorium *on the testing of nuclear weapons*. This had been done in the hope -- vain as it turned out -- that such a unilateral moratorium would induce other NWS to take decisive measures toward a comprehensive test ban, to which they had been committed since the original treaty in 1963. Even after the Soviets unilaterally extended the moratorium for another six months after the first year, there was no response other than Cold War propaganda from the other NWS. In the United States, it was even suggested that the Soviets might send a rocket behind the sun in order to violate their own moratorium -- a typical example of a Cold War's "worst case scenario" -- although in fact both they and the United States had observed the 1963 ban on atmospheric testing.

The extension of the NPT was urged in part as a condition for the negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and this was in fact finally achieved, although it appears that U.S. scientists are now confident that computer simulations may allow them to continue the development of nuclear weapons without a need for actual underground explosions -- except for the "sub-critical" ones that they have recently announced. France continued with another round of underground tests in the South Pacific in 1996, which hardly seems in accord with the NPT. The reaction against these tests was heartening, but aside from declaring that these tests had been enough and that they would not need any more, there have been no signs that France has any intention of moving toward nuclear disarmament.

In pushing for an indefinite extension of the 1972 NPT, the Canadian government played a very aggressive role, while Canadian NGOs in the peace movement had on the whole argued strenuously against such an extension, largely on the grounds that this would simply strengthen the status quo. It remains to be seen if the commitment implied in this aggressive attitude will support a commitment to force the implementation of Article 6 and its obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons.

There is no question but that Canada is in a somewhat ambiguous situation, having taken a leading role in the extension of the NPT, while maintaining its membership in NATO, which is committed to the maintenance of the nuclear deterrent. Like the Americans with respect to the Geneva agreements of 1956 over Vietnam (they were not signers, so they saw no contradiction in ignoring the agreements), NATO as such is not bound by the NPT, even though all members of the alliance have in fact signed it. Indeed, through some kind of *fiat*, NATO regards itself as in compliance since, in the process of seeking a consensus agreement, they may hope to abolish nuclear weapons sometime in the next five hundred years!

Thus, notwithstanding Canada's strong commitment to the NPT, the NATO Council in Brussels, on December 10, 1996, issued the following statement:

The nuclear forces of the Allies continue to play a unique and essential role in the Alliance's strategy of war prevention. New members, who will be full members of the Alliance in all respects, will be expected to support the concept of deterrence and the essential role nuclear weapons play in the Alliance's strategy . . . NATO countries have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members nor any need to change any aspects of NATO'S nuclear posture or nuclear policy--and we do not foresee any future need to do so. (*NATO press communique M-NAC-2 (96) 165*, 10 December 1996)

There is no mention, either here or in other NATO documents, of the advisory decision of the International Court of Justice. It has been argued that the ICJ decision gives neither a red nor a green light to nuclear weapons, since the decision had stated that:

. . . in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear

weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake. (ICJ advisory decision, section 105, Paragraph E. July 8, 1996)

This particular paragraph from the ICJ decision was affirmed by a split vote: seven to seven, with the President casting the deciding vote.

However, with respect to the question of the NPT, the final paragraph of the ICJ decision is surely relevant, and it should be noted that this was a *unanimous* vote on the part of the Court:

There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control (ibid.).

Here again, the nuclear weapon states, as with the NPT, may somewhat disingenuously declare themselves in compliance, although it has been noted that they now ***have more nuclear weapons than they had when the NPT was originally agreed upon in 1972.***

It should also be noted that, according to the NATO statement, "the fundamental purpose of nuclear weapons is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion." In other words, the objective of nuclear weapons is not to be achieved in their actual use, but in the threat of use. One could say that the idea is to preserve peace and prevent coercion through what has often been called ***nuclear blackmail***. This was a factor from the beginning of the nuclear age. Some fifty years after the event, there is no convincing evidence of any military necessity for the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. General Eisenhower, for instance, opposed the bombings. There is moreover considerable evidence to justify Alperovitz's thesis that the Hiroshima-Nagasaki bombings were carried out to intimidate the Soviets.¹⁹

This certainly is the view of Dr. Josef Rotblat, the winner of the 1955 Nobel Peace Prize. He was working on the bomb in Los Alamos, N. M. when he learned in 1944 that the Germans had abandoned their attempts to build a bomb. Realizing the dangers inherent in the bomb, he saw no reason to continue his work. His sole motivation was his conviction that the "only way to stop the Germans from using it against us would be if we, too, had the bomb and threatened to retaliate."²⁰ When he told General Leslie Groves his opinion that work on the bomb should stop, Groves, according to Rotblat, replied that "the real purpose in making the bomb was to subdue the Soviets."²¹ When Rotblat heard this, he immediately resigned and returned to England. It was this principled action that helped him win the Nobel prize.

We now know that as early as March 1945, the Japanese had only three per cent of prewar petroleum supplies -- a shortage that was due more to U.S. submarine warfare than to air power. Whether U.S. intelligence was aware of the extent of the petroleum shortage at the time is another question, but there was no doubt that Japan was already defeated, as U.S. aircraft constantly overflew Japanese territory unopposed. The alarmist estimate of "a million allied deaths" in an invasion of Japan came

only after the Hiroshima-Nagasaki bombings, in a patent attempt to justify this first use of nuclear weapons.²² This propaganda effort includes the fallacy of concluding *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*, that the bombing forced the Japanese to surrender, as if they had not been working toward this for several months before the bombings.²³ This is not simply a matter of hindsight. The immediate reaction to the bombing included a number of very negative judgements. In the United States, the Protestant journal, *The Christian Century*, in its issue of August 29, 1945, published an editorial entitled "America's Moral Atrocity," in which it stated:

Our leaders seem not to have weighed the moral considerations involved. No sooner was the bomb ready than it was rushed to the front and dropped on two helpless cities, destroying more lives than the United States lost in the entire war (*The Christian Century*, August 29, 1945, p. 974).

On August 24, 1945, the Roman Catholic journal, *The Commonweal*, made a similar condemnation:

...like everyone else, we will have to write a great deal about the future of humanity and the atomic bomb. But we will not have to worry any more about keeping our victory clean. It is defiled . . .

"The name Hiroshima, the name Nagasaki are names for American guilt and shame." (*The Commonweal*, August 14, 1945)

These were in fact minority opinions. The bomb was a completely unknown quantity, and even the small circle of elites who made the decision to use it did not realize the full extent of the horror until after Hiroshima. And this circle of elites simply did not consider any moral dimensions. The questions raised immediately afterwards by the editors of *The Christian Century* and *The Commonweal* were never asked by those at the centre of power. General Groves, speculating on the possible use of the bomb in the event of an invasion of Japan, had contemplated sending American troops into the territory the day after a nuclear attack, on foot if necessary. As Bernstein notes, this would have increased allied casualties enormously.²⁴ This was still an age of innocence with respect to environmental effects of nuclear explosions and the impact of radiation. Atmospheric nuclear weapons tests went on into the 1950s, until André Sakharov published his findings on the hazards of nuclear fallout, which eventually led to the first test ban treaty in 1963.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty now has a mechanism for periodic review. Whether this will occasion any change in the status quo is open to serious doubt. In a late 1997 UN General Assembly session a Malaysian resolution, cited the World Court's unanimous insistence on the need for negotiations. Operative Paragraph 3, one of the two major statements of the resolution, underlines "the unanimous conclusion of the Court that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."

The three NATO Nuclear Weapons States (United States, United Kingdom, and France) campaigned strongly against the Malaysian resolution, which they claimed to have been selectively quoted from the World Court's complicated decision.

Canada was pressed by NATO leadership to oppose the Malaysian resolution. The Canadian government called for a separate vote on Operative Paragraph 3. The United States and the United Kingdom objected to this, but the vote was held: 139 votes in favour, 7 against, 20 abstentions. Nineteen did not vote. In addition to the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, Monaco, Romania, Turkey and Latvia voted against the Operative Paragraph. In the same Malaysian resolution, Operative Paragraph 4 calls upon:

all states to fulfil that obligation immediately by commencing multilateral negotiations in 1997 leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for the elimination."

On this paragraph Canada voted no. NATO pressure was intense, and the paragraph carried with 110 in favour, 27 against, 29 abstentions and 19 non-voting.

In the vote on the Malaysian resolution as a whole, Canada voted no with NATO, but it is noteworthy that NATO's three Nordic members - Denmark, Iceland, and Norway - abstained. This implies support in principle even while certain phrases present a problem for the abstaining nations. Thus even though these three countries did not support the resolution, they did defy the NATO whip.

Ireland, Sweden, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, South Africa and China all voted yes. Abstainers included Japan, Australia, Austria, Israel and Finland. Russia, which under Mikhail Gorbachev proposed in 1985 a 15-year plan to eliminate all nuclear weapons in the world, was pulled into the no column by the U.S., the U. K. and France.²⁵

While the NWS, and particularly the three Western states, have attempted to interpret the World Court decision as proclaiming the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons "... in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake." this position overlooks the unanimous support of the court for the following statement:

A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons (ICJ advisory decision, ICJ advisory decision, section 105, Paragraph D. July 8, 1996)

It is hard to imagine how NATO policy could be reconciled with this, or even with the split decision that envisions a legitimate use of nuclear weapons "in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake." Such an extreme circumstance would in no

way exempt the nuclear power from observation of the "principles and rules of international humanitarian law." Those given to scenarios for such lawful use imagine a ship in the middle of the sea or some such thing. In almost any other scenario collateral damage would be completely disproportionate to the extent that it would involve a violation of the "principles and rules of international humanitarian law." It must also be assumed that the World Court includes the NPT among the "specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons.

It is extremely difficult to reconcile NATO policy with the commitments of the Non Proliferation Treaty. By remaining in NATO, Canada is in effect in a very ambiguous position, in effect supporting the Western Nuclear Powers and NATO in what can only be seen as undermining the Non Proliferation Treaty.

NATO and the COLD WAR

We are told that the Cold War is over. But in certain areas the ways of thinking characteristic of the Cold War are still very much in evidence. This is particularly the case with respect to the dominance of what U.S. President Eisenhower called "The Military Industrial Complex" in Western, and particularly in the U.S. economy.

It is useful to look carefully at the state of the Cold War before the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. The context is the renewed arms race started by the Reagan administration in the United States. The rationale for the arms race was the doctrine of *deterrence*, which was based on a number of assumptions. The first of these was that the Soviet Union represented a threat to Western Europe and "The Free World," that the Soviet Union was inherently expansionist and determined to establish some kind of world empire. At its worst this is simply a matter of mirror-image thinking. The ideologues of the United States simply cannot imagine anyone not determined to impose his own system on the whole world. Even "neutrality" was looked upon as a fate worse than death. The capitalist economy of the United States, according to them, is entitled to extend itself on a worldwide basis, and this extension is threatened by the presence of any system which would deny access to markets -- *anywhere in the world* -- to the business interests of the United States. To close any area to the penetration of U.S. business interests is, by definition, aggression. Even to limit or establish onerous conditions on the business activities of U.S. corporations is unacceptable. So this aggression must be deterred by a show of military might. And since it cannot be phrased for public consumption as supporting the expansionist tendencies of U.S. business, it must be redefined in terms of a Soviet threat to the territorial integrity of the Western Alliance. NATO was established as an allegedly "defensive" military alliance. After the Soviets developed nuclear weapons, the old concept of *deterrence* was resurrected.²⁶ The need for deterrence served to keep the Cold War alive and to nourish the Military- Industrial Complex.

Deterrence Theory

The late Edward Thompson wrote concerning the theory of deterrence:

It is in truth a pitiful, light-weight theory. It is espoused, in its pristine purity, only by a handful of monkish celibates, retired within the walls of centres of Strategic Studies. It cannot endure any intercourse with the actual world. It is at heart a very simple, and simple-minded idea, which occurred to the first cave men when they got hold of clubs. (It is this very simplicity which gives to it a certain populist plausibility). If I have a club, that will deter him from clobbering me. The thought has gone on, through armies and empires, dreadnoughts and gas; all that a historian can say is that sometimes it has worked for a while, and sometimes it has not, but always in the end it has broken down.²⁷

Deterrence theory, as Thompson notes, is not an operative theory. It "appears always as a gloss, as a theoretical legitimation of actions which are taken for quite different reasons."²⁸ Thompson notes that the U.S. Strategic Air Command was established (in 1946), "not to deter Soviet attack, but to threaten a United States first strike against Russia."²⁹ Deterrence theory is based on "speculative exercises in futurology, derived from worst-case analysis."³⁰ Thus throughout the 1980s the arms race continued and was nourished and enhanced by such scenarios. It was assumed that the Soviets were somehow "ahead of us," in some military technology or other, while in fact the United States has consistently lead the Soviets in every technological development with the possible exception of fighter aircraft, which in today's context are patently irrelevant, being built now in the West principally to keep defence industries in business. These are, in addition, defensive in nature, although in so far as they might protect Soviet air space from alien incursions, they were regarded as a threat.

Numbers Game

The Cold War ideology also involved many specious numbers games. For example, the menace of Soviet "conventional arms" showed a great imbalance in tanks vis-à-vis NATO forces. It was seldom pointed out that something like half of these menacing Soviet tanks were holdovers from the 1939-1945 war (T-54s). The worst-case scenario did not allow for such fine distinctions.

The introduction of Soviet SS-20 missiles was used as a pretext to upgrade NATO forces with missiles that could reach into the heart of Soviet territory (Pershing II and Cruise missiles). The Soviets themselves were somewhat ingenuous on this, since they claimed that the SS-20 missiles were simple replacements for the older SS-5 missiles, when in fact they were technologically superior. On the other hand, in playing out the numbers game NATO rules excluded any mention of the Western Alliance's overwhelming superiority in submarine-based ballistic missiles.

Edward Thompson noted that public opinion was carefully manufactured by the defense establishments:

the American public was informed that Europeans were crying out for cruise missiles, the European public was informed that the United States insisted upon sending them, and both were informed that NATO was working in the best interests of all.³¹

The information provided was always partial, always crafted to suit the plans of the power involved. Thus "the British government issued an official White Paper of astounding mendacity, in which Poseidon, Polaris and countless lesser delivery systems simply disappeared."³² The assumptions on which Cold War logic rested often changed as different "needs" appeared. In 1987, the Canadian government issued a White Paper on defence based on assumptions that involved the situation of the 1939-45 war, to justify the purchase of a number of submarines to keep the Atlantic sea lanes open and to defend Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.³³ In fact, these submarines were required (or desired) to integrate with forward strategies which, if fully implemented--always a hypothetical proposition-- would have given the U.S. a first-strike position by eliminating Soviet missile-carrying submarines. The strategy involved had nothing to do with keeping sea-lanes open, a rather quixotic proposition in any event when a full-blown nuclear war involving ICBMs could be over in a few hours. As for Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, it has to date been violated mainly by U.S. submarines.

The Soviets, quite naturally, developed their own versions of the same game. They were threatened by thousands of missiles from the Western camp (the Pershing II missiles were ten minutes from downtown Moscow), and were constantly aware of the fact that the Western powers enjoyed, from the beginning to the end, a definite superiority, in numbers, firepower and delivery technology. Thoughtful people on both sides were also painfully aware that, as the obscenity of the arms race went on, these differences became increasingly irrelevant. Does a numerical advantage of a few hundred, or a few thousand nuclear warheads have any real meaning when the question is whether both sides could mutually destroy the world three times or four times?

Nuclear Weapons, Real or Symbolic?

The difficulty is that in this weapons game the players lose all track of reality. The weapons themselves, deadly as they are, become largely symbolic. The numbers, rather than the weapons as such, become the important factor. If this were not enough, the numbers themselves are often specious, as already mentioned, in which hundreds of nuclear missiles are not counted because they are on submarines rather than on land. In the real world they are probably even more dangerous because they are more effective, less vulnerable. But when they were not counted, this gave the Soviet bloc a numerical advantage over NATO, which in turn justified more expenditure and more numbers in the supposedly defensive arsenal of the Western Alliance. It is important to emphasize

that nuclear weapons are supposedly defensive; the only defensive element in a ballistic missile capable of destroying a whole city with one shot is the subjectively attributed element of the good intentions of those who have them. This is not enough to make them defensive weapons. NATO in fact has some authentically defensive weapons: antitank guns, for example (in which they enjoy a decisive superiority over the Russians). But NATO, today, eight years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, adamantly refuses to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons and the NATO bureaucracy is busily engaged in formulating new strategies for nuclear weapons made obsolete by the disappearance of the Soviet threat.

The nuclear weapons deployed by NATO member states, along with those of other nuclear weapons states are in fact useless. As George Kennan wrote, "The nuclear bomb is the most useless weapon ever invented . . . it is not even an effective weapon against itself."³⁴ Useless, that is, unless someone really wants to destroy the world and the people in it. Again, as Edward Thompson wrote:

There is an existing state of threat: but to add and add to that threat is, in military terms, futile. Given the initial equilibrium of Mutually Assured Destruction, each additional weapon has been useless. They might as well not exist. The significance of these weapons is symbolic only.³⁵

This has probably been the case since the debriefing after the bombing of Hiroshima. It was then realized that no nation could actually *use* nuclear weapons and maintain the pretence of being civilized. So the elaborate symbolic game of nuclear blackmail began, and has continued ever since.

The Game Becomes the Reality

NATO is perhaps our best example of the way that the whole game has acquired a life of its own, independent of any concrete reality. When the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, there was much talk of a *peace dividend*. After seven years, there is hardly any sign of it. An article in the *NATO Review* stated categorically that "the peace dividend is a mirage and increased spending on defence is necessary because the United States is withdrawing troops and resources from Europe."³⁶

This represents one of the great weaknesses of Cold War thinking and of the structure of NATO itself: there is such a fixation with military hardware, military strategy, military solutions, that there is an inability even to envision other than military solutions to problems. Talk of nuclear disarmament is regarded as utopian dreaming. And the fear of another Great Depression, a fear that is in part responsible for the Cold War itself, is still with us, even though the Cold War, in the words of American historian Walter LaFeber, ". . . in the 1980s triggered the worst economic depression in forty years."³⁷ From all appearances, there is no escape. The symbolism of the arms race, the fixation with weaponry, appears to have closed all other avenues to the resolution of international problems. Weaponry is first, and is a law unto itself. There is then little serious diplomacy, *except* within the context of the now one-sided arms race, now turned into a desperate race against economic depression. Talks about nuclear disarmament are indeed important and necessary, yet as

these have been done to date and are being done, the only foreseeable result is another version of the status quo. Since it is difficult to claim, with a straight face, that nuclear weapons are necessary to counter a Russian threat, nuclear weapons are now envisioned as a "peace-enforcing" mechanism against third world states that might get out of line, an effort that has been described as "nuclear gunboat diplomacy."

This kind of thinking is sometimes made plausible by the horrors of such events as the massacres of Rwanda and civil strife in many third world areas, fuelled by a new resurgence of the international arms trade, as surplus arms are flogged in order to maintain the profits of an arms industry that is now seen to be superfluous. Nevertheless, in the economic game plans of most industrial nations today, arms exports are a very important item, and there is no evidence that this has changed. Paradoxically, this industry is deemed important enough to be subsidized, since even subsidized exports can help to underwrite the costs of research and development. This is particularly important for small countries such as Israel, since it may be a condition for having an arms industry of their own. For large industrialized nations, the rationale may be slightly different, but in any event, an organization such as NATO, which serves to define all international problems in military terms, is an important symbolic item in the maintenance of the arms trade.

How Did We Get Here?

The Cold War was a struggle against communism. But the seeds of it were sown well before the Russian revolution of 1917. The United States represents an empire obsessed with an inherently expansionist philosophy, which through much of the past century has been expressed with the code-word, "the Open Door." Open, that is, to American traders. This was proclaimed as far back as 1823 with the "Monroe Doctrine," even though this was, in its original form, unenforceable without the acquiescence of the British Empire. Latin America was the first part of the American colonial empire, but it was quickly extended to the Far East, where Yankee traders were involved even before their own rebellion against Britain in 1776. By the 1840s the campaign to subdue the North American continent was undertaken with the slogan of "Manifest Destiny." The Russians had subdued much of their continent without really peopling it to any significant extent, and in 1867 they sold their settlements in Alaska to the Americans who were then left with only Canada to complete their manifest destiny. By that time they had given up political absorption of the North, opting instead for the same kind of economic hegemony that they enjoyed in Latin America.

It is interesting to note that American public opinion was at one with the British government in condemning Chinese restrictions on trade in the 1830s. The drug trade, which was behind the opium wars was very much included in the free trade doctrine of the time.

As the Russians retreated from Alaska they showed increasing interest in Manchuria and North China, where the Americans had already staked their claim to an Open Door. In addition, the Russian Empire itself -- Czarist Russia -- was more political than commercial. A Manchuria colonized by Russia would not be open to Yankee traders. The American historian Walter LaFeber noted:

From the 1890s until 1917 the United States tried to contain Russian expansion, usually by supporting Japan, which, for its own purposes, also wanted an open Manchuria. President Theodore Roosevelt exemplified American sentiments: The Russians "are utterly insincere and treacherous; they have no conception of the truth . . . and no regard for others." As for the czar, he was "a preposterous little creature." More to the point, TR feared Russia was trying "to organize northern China against us."³⁸

As a system, capitalism is inherently expansionist. It must, according to its adherents, grow or die. This absolutely demands freedom to trade, although they have never objected to captive markets as long as they were their own. It is true, as LaFeber notes, that the Czarist bureaucracy was brutal, instigating pogroms against Jews and sending political dissenters to Siberia.³⁹ The United States has never hesitated to join international organizations as long as it can dominate them. Nor has it ever hesitated to trade with oppressive regimes as long as they guaranteed a stable and profitable climate for American business. The Czarist bureaucracy was protectionist, and hence unacceptable. So from the 1890s until 1917 the United States tried to contain Russian expansion, usually by supporting Japan, which for its own purposes, also wanted an open Manchuria.⁴⁰

The Soviet Union

After the revolution of 1917, the Bolshevik's Marxist ideology made matters even worse. And as the Americans joined the war against Germany the Russians made a separate peace. The antagonism between the United States and Russia became even more entrenched:

It was on 8 January 1918, while Trotsky was urging the Allies to join Russia at the Brest-Litovsk conference table, that President Woodrow Wilson delivered his famous address to Congress listing Fourteen Points as 'the only possible program' for peace; and the President's words were intended as a moral counter-offensive to the attractive appeal of the Bolsheviks for an immediate end to all fighting. Subsequently, of course, the speech was hailed as a basic charter for freedom among the European peoples. At the time, however, although many agreed with Wilson's general sentiments, his specific proposals had few champions outside the English-speaking nations and some continental liberal democrats felt, not merely disappointed, but positively betrayed by their chosen prophet.⁴¹

After the armistice signalling the defeat of Germany and Austria was signed, Wilson sent more than ten thousand American soldiers to help the Allies, including Canada, overthrow the fledgeling Bolshevik government. The consequences were predictable:

In the short run many Russians fled from the foreign troops to support Lenin. In the long-run Soviet leaders would not forget that the intervention seemed to confirm their belief that "capitalist encirclement" aimed at strangulating the communist regime.⁴²

LaFeber notes that at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, "The Western powers tried to isolate the Soviets by creating such buffer states as Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in Eastern Europe."⁴³ In theory, Lenin's nationality policy had established self-determination as a basic principle, but in practice only Poland, Finland and the three Baltic states were to become independent states. The Poles, with French military assistance, occupied part of the Western Ukraine. The Soviets reclaimed this territory in 1939 and the Baltic states in 1940.

In the early 1920s, despite the attempt to isolate the new Russian regime, the British began trading with Russia in 1921. In the early 1920s an American relief mission distributed large amounts of aid to starving Russians, and secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover encouraged businessmen to invest in Russia. Between 1925 and 1930 Soviet-American trade rose to more than one hundred millions of dollars, above the prewar figure, and U.S. corporations such as Ford, General Electric and Westinghouse invested millions of dollars in the 1920s.⁴⁴ In the context of the American depression, businessmen urged newly-elected President Roosevelt to recognize Soviet Russia, which he did in 1933. Relations were formalized, but were hardly cordial.

As Hitler proceeded to rearm Germany, Stalin desperately attempted to develop alliances to defend Russia against Japan and Germany. "Roosevelt refused to respond to the Russian appeal. The State Department even assured the Japanese in 1933 that recognition of Russia should not be taken as a threat against Japan."⁴⁵ Stalin's requests for assistance in the face of threats from Germany and Japan fell on deaf ears, and in a desperate attempt to buy time, Stalin signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler in August of 1939.

In 1941 Hitler invaded Russia in what LaFeber calls "history's greatest military operation."⁴⁶ Harry S. Truman, Democratic Senator from Missouri, summed up what many Americans felt: "If we see that Germany is winning we should help Russia and if Russia is winning we should help Germany and that way let them kill-as many as possible, although I don't want to see Hitler victorious under any circumstances."⁴⁷ Already engaged in aid to Great Britain, the U.S. government somewhat reluctantly concluded that Russia should be helped in the struggle against Hitler's Germany. With the attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941 the United States formally entered the war against Japan and Germany and the U.S. and the Soviet Union became full-pledged allies. The Americans sent billions of dollars in aid to the beleaguered Soviet Union, yet probably for military reasons -- which were interpreted by Stalin as political -- Stalin's pleas for a second front in Western Europe were put off until June of 1944, and by then the Russians had regained the initiative on the Eastern front.

Roosevelt had agreed in 1943 that the Baltic states should remain in the Soviet Union, although Stalin's requests to include other frontier areas that had been part of Czarist Russia were rebuffed, or rather, any decision had been put off until after the war. In 1944 Churchill had agreed, in exchange for a free hand in Greece, to include Rumania and Bulgaria in a postwar Russian sphere of influence, and the parts of Ukraine that had been conquered by Poland in 1920 were to remain in the Soviet Union.

During the course of the war, Stalin had played down communist ideology and insisted on the defence of *Mother Russia*. The war came to be known to the Russians of that generation and those to follow as "The Great Patriotic War." When the Cold War ensued following the defeat of Germany, American propagandists claimed the Soviet Union was expansionist and was fomenting revolutions throughout the world. This charge, which was the one of the reasons for the creation of NATO, was patently untrue. Stalin's priorities were quite clear: the rebuilding and the defence of Russia. The last thing he wanted was to engage in military adventures abroad.

Atomic Diplomacy

Stalin had, at Yalta, agreed to enter the war against Japan three months after the end of the war in Europe. There is some evidence that the extreme haste with which the atomic bomb was employed was due in part at least to a desire to anticipate the Russian entry into the war. At the same time, it had been hoped that a Russian declaration of war against Japan would force the Japanese to an earlier surrender. While the Red army had in fact overwhelmed the *Wermacht*, it was, one might say, considerably less than a menace to the West, and Stalin's intentions even less so. He was busy enough at home. Yet the seeds of later mistrust had been sown. General MacArthur only learned of the existence of the atomic bomb five days before it was used at Hiroshima. Stalin only learned of it after it was actually employed, although Russian scientists had guessed that the project was underway as early as 1942, paradoxically, because of the secrecy surrounding the project -- articles on nuclear fission suddenly disappeared from Western scientific journals.

It can in fact be argued that some measure of the Cold War itself was due to the use of the atomic bomb, and the "get tough" attitude of the Americans once the bomb had been successfully tested.⁴⁸ General Eisenhower, the Allied Commander in Europe, and the other two American Chiefs of Staff had all been opposed to the use of the bomb, on two grounds: that there was no military necessity, and that using the bomb as a threat to the Soviets might make cooperation with them more difficult in the future. Edgar Snow reports that Eisenhower, answering "a private question privately" on a visit to Moscow shortly after Hiroshima, had said:

Before the bomb was used I would have said yes, I was sure we could keep the peace with Russia. Now, I don't know. I had hoped the bomb wouldn't figure in this war. Until now I would have said that we three, Britain with her mighty fleet, America with the strongest air force, and Russia with the strongest land force on the continent, we three could have guaranteed the peace of the world for a long, long time to come. But now, I don't know. People are frightened and disturbed all over. Everyone feels insecure again.⁴⁹

One may argue about the reasons for using the atomic bomb against the Japanese when there was no real military necessity. The notion that American possession of the bomb might make the Russians more willing to accept American diplomacy was certainly a part of it, although in fact it only made the Russians more suspicious and had a powerful role in beginning the Cold War, and the nuclear

arms race. It should be emphasized that the wild exaggerations as to the number of lives saved through the use of the bomb ("hundreds of thousands, a million, millions") all appeared after the bombs were used, in an attempt to justify the unjustifiable, and had nothing to do with staff calculations of casualties for a hypothetical invasion of Japan.

Today, as Gar Alperovitz notes in the introduction to his 1995 book on the subject, "The consensus among scholars is that the bomb was not needed to avoid an invasion of Japan and to end the war within a relatively short time."⁵⁰ General Carl Spaatz of the U.S. Army Air Force said in a 1965 interview that the use of the bomb was "purely a political decision, wasn't a military decision."⁵¹ The timing was almost certainly connected with the Soviet promise to enter the war against Japan three months after the end of the war in Europe. Stalin kept his promise and invaded Manchuria on August 8, an action which had been prepared well in advance, and certainly had no connection with the American use of the bomb. It is certainly interesting to read, in the context of later received ideas, a postwar article by Brigadier General Bonner Fellers from 1947: ". . . the atomic bomb neither induced the Emperor's decision to surrender nor had any effect on the ultimate outcome of the war."⁵²

The most signal effect of the use of the bomb was then to reveal its secret -- the fact that such a bomb was possible -- to the world. The use of the possession of such a bomb to secure American hegemony against the Soviets enhanced the already suspicious attitude of Stalin and precipitated the arms race as the Soviets rushed to develop their own bombs.

The German Question

The future of Germany was a central bone of contention. In 1946 Secretary of State James Byrnes "attempted to meet Russian fears of a militarized Germany by proposing that the Big Four powers sign a treaty unifying the country and guaranteeing its demilitarization. Molotov rejected this because of a key Russian policy change on reparations."⁵³ This was coupled with the partial repudiation of the Yalta agreement on the part of the Americans, which in practice left the Russians with their own zone, largely agricultural, in a Germany so devastated that the whole question of reparations became problematical. The Russians and the French feared a resurgence of German militarism. The Americans wanted a recovered Germany as a trading partner.

It is important to recall the great anxiety in the United States over a transition to a peacetime economy. This is often neglected in the context of the emergence of the Cold War. One needs only browse through the *New York Times* for August and September of 1945 to realize how important this question was. There was a great fear of a return to the Great Depression years of 1929-1939. Henry Stimson and Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, "believed that world recovery depended on a strong, industrialized Europe. That required at its heart, as it had for a century, a rebuilt Germany."⁵⁴

As the Cold War developed, it became clear that the Americans wanted this rebuilt Germany in their own sphere of influence. They would have preferred a united Europe, with free trade for all, but Stalin's suspicion and fear of Western aggression made that impossible. The Soviets did not want a rebuilt Germany on their frontiers. An independent Finland was, in the end, acceptable -- Sweden was not a menace -- but the *cordon sanitaire* between Russia and Germany was not a negotiable item

for Stalin. Rather than accede to American demands the Soviets, in the summer of 1946, rejected the terms of a one billion-dollar American loan. As LaFeber notes, "Control of their border areas was worth more to the Russians than \$1 billion, or even \$10 billion . . . By 1946, however, the attempt to buy off the Soviets had worked no better than Washington's vague hope that the atomic bomb might somehow make them more "manageable."⁵⁵

The Truman Doctrine

Meanwhile, a revolution threatened in Greece. Stalin had kept his promise to Churchill and had not helped the Greek communists. The Greek problem was just that, a Greek problem, and while some Americans were less than happy with the conduct of the Greek government, it was deemed essential that as much of the world as possible remain open to American business. In a major speech at Baylor University President Truman declared:

that if the expansion of state-controlled economies (such as the communists) was not stopped and an open world marketplace restored for private businessmen, depression would occur and the government would have to intervene massively in the society. Americans could then bid farewell to both their traditional economic and personal freedoms . . . He concluded "We must not go through the thirties again."⁵⁶

This was in effect the crucial economic dimension of the "Truman Doctrine." While no serious observer felt that there was any danger of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, Truman needed to call on the menace of communism to justify massive military and economic aid programmes in order to create a revitalized and open world economy. The Marshall plan, set up carefully with conditions that guaranteed the exclusion of the Soviet Union, made possible both the recovery of Western Europe and the maintenance of U.S. industry in the immediate postwar period. This is in effect the immediate background to the establishment of NATO.

The Marshall Plan now appears not the beginning but the end of an era. It marked the last phase in the administration's use of economic tactics as the primary means of tying together the Western world. The plan's approach, that peaceful and positive approach which Reinhold Niebuhr applauded, soon evolved into military alliances. Truman proved to be correct in saying that the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan are "two halves of the same walnut." Americans willingly acquiesced as the military aspects of the doctrine developed into quite the larger part.⁵⁷

In his Baylor University speech, Truman had already threatened that if a world marketplace were not established, the U.S. government would have to intervene massively in American society. For many in industrial sectors, the militarization of the economy was preferable to New Deal-type programmes. NATO was then to serve admirably for a number of purposes. Established in 1949, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed to defend against an attack on the West by the Warsaw Pact countries,"⁵⁸ NATO, once Germany was admitted in 1955, provided for *the rearmament of West Germany under international control* -- a crucial condition if the French were to agree -- and a guaranteed market for military suppliers.

By 1949, it was Stalin's turn to propose a unified, demilitarized Germany. This time the Americans rejected the notion. The division of Europe into two hostile blocs was complete. The Cold War had solidified into a situation that, by 1948, resulted in the imposition of hardline communist governments in the countries that were to form the Warsaw Pact in 1955. Stalin's 1949 "peace offensive" amounted to a last-ditch attempt to prevent the arming of Germany. While the Soviets were close to testing a nuclear bomb, something like half of the Red Army transport was horse-drawn until 1950. As formidable as the Red Army had been when the homeland was invaded, it was in no condition to mount an invasion of Western Europe. But by this time the "peace initiative" was unacceptable. An unsigned article in *Business Week* magazine for 12th February of 1949 spelled out the alternatives for American businessmen. An end to the Cold War might well mean "More trade between eastern and western Europe -- and between the whole Soviet bloc and the U.S." Such an event would also "remove the worst threat of inflation -- open-ended military spending." But "in the long pull, that shift would change the course of the economy profoundly." . .

For one thing, the Truman Administration would get its chance to go ahead with civilian spending programs that the big military budget has kept under wraps. As soon as the admirals and generals took a back seat, you could expect Truman to come up with elaborate plans for the development of national resources, expansion of public works, broadening of social welfare programs.⁵⁹

The author goes on to note that such spending would be seen by the Truman government as necessary to keep the business boom going. And while the authors of the article are scrupulously neutral with respect to Stalin's peace proposals, they are careful to point out a crucial difference between military spending and social welfare programmes:

But there's a tremendous social and economic difference between welfare pump-priming and military pump-priming. It makes the government's role in the economy -- its importance to business -- greater than ever. Military spending doesn't really alter the structure of the economy. It goes through the regular channels. As far as a businessman is concerned, a munitions order from the government is much like an order from a private customer. But the kind of welfare and public-works spending that Truman plans does alter the economy. It makes new channels of its own. It creates new institutions. It redistributes income. It shifts demand from one industry to another. It changes the whole economic pattern. That's its object.⁶⁰

One might in fact question whether military spending is "much like an order from a private customer." There is nothing like the same kind of competition where military contracts are involved. Many of them were and are done on a cost-plus basis . . . "Military Keynesianism" tends to maintain the social and economic status quo by redistributing income from the civilian sector to the military-industrial complex. And it hardly seems, forty-eight years later, that there was the slightest chance of Stalin's peace initiative being accepted. The end of the "Soviet threat" would indeed have produced serious changes in the U.S. economy. NATO provided a captive market. It also guaranteed a continuing U.S. presence in Europe. But there is no question but that NATO was and is a

quintessential Cold War institution, and institution closely connected to what President Eisenhower was to call "The Military-Industrial Complex."

The editors of *Business Week* were perhaps prematurely alarmed. Forty years later the Warsaw Pact was disbanded, some Americans proclaimed the end of history and the permanent triumph of capitalism, and the "peace dividend" that was mentioned here and there in 1989 has been permanently shelved. NATO remains, and is a key player in ensuring that the peace dividend goes the way of Stalin's peace offensive. NATO, to be sure, is an anachronism. But in its origins it had in fact more to do with the care and feeding of the Military-Industrial Complex than with any serious "defence" role.

The Expansion of NATO

The expansion of NATO is cast in the same mode of thought as was the original founding of NATO. Under the cover of "defence," NATO served in fact to lock the nations of the Western Alliance into an economic and political system with institutional ties to the hegemony of the United States. As Mary Brennan notes, "the publicised aim of NATO has always been to support, encourage, and if possible expand its own political system and its relevant institutions."⁶¹ NATO is now engaged in expanding this system to middle and eastern Europe, but the initial thrust into Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary is seen by the Russians as a revival of Cold War system of opposing blocs and a threat to their security.

Thus the Russians have recently, in reaction to NATO expansion, adopted the NATO policy of first use of nuclear weapons. With talk of NATO moving into the Baltic states, Belarus has called a halt to nuclear disarmament. The end result is likely to be a strange bonanza for defence industries, strange because while they can equip new NATO members with western weapons and communications systems, neither these new NATO members nor the Western alliance is in a position to underwrite the expense -- variously estimated from 30 billions of U.S. dollars to 250 billions. The most likely scenario is that the cost would be undertaken by borrowing on the part of new members, increasing debts that they would be incapable of paying, particularly since the opportunity costs of such militarization-- monies spent on arms rather than on economic development--would be extremely high in terms of the economies of these nations. As banks create money by lending it, NATO expansion is likely to create money by floating loans for the incorporation of Eastern European nations into the alliance.

In a letter distributed to the Canadian Press, David Morgan of Veterans Against Nuclear Arms noted that total dollars and cents cost more than twelve years may range from \$27 billion to \$120 billion.⁶²

David Morgan continues:

Canada's share of these costs "would be about six percent of the total," ranging from \$1.62 billion to \$7.2 billion, or between \$135 million and \$600 million per year, and

not \$45 to \$59 million (Canadian) as the *Globe and Mail* article mistakenly shows. This cost range of \$135 to \$600 million converts to \$184 to \$819 million (Canadian) and represents from 1.8% to 8.2% of our 1997-'98 defence spending.⁶³

The whole business is rather perplexing. It takes some very specious argument to regard the Russian federation as a threat, and in fact NATO spokesmen have taken care to say that they do not wish to threaten the Russian federation. Nuclear arms presumably would not be stationed in the newly-incorporated NATO countries in the near future. NATO has also promised not to station a "substantial" number of troops in these countries. It has however refused to state what it means by "substantial." It has also refused to promise that it will never station nuclear weapons there. There is a serious contradiction here, since the whole expansion implies an extension of the Cold War assumptions behind NATO. And this has already provoked a reaction on the part of the Russian Federation. In a letter to *The New York Times* (5th February 1997) George F. Kennan wrote:

Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy, to restore the atmosphere of the Cold War . . . expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold-War era.⁶⁴

In adopting NATO's first use nuclear policy the Russian Federation points to a three-to-one NATO advantage in conventional weapons. This may in fact have been the case for some time. One American arms salesman described Russian hardware as "junk," and Russian arms expenditures have gone down by something like 45 per cent since the proclaimed end of the Cold War. One could speak of a unilateral ending of the Cold War-- on the part of the Russians--since the western arms industry is still operating at close to Cold War levels.

There is also a certain amount of flim-flam regarding NATO itself. It is said on the one hand that the Europeans want NATO to continue because the United States is withdrawing troops, and on the other that the Americans want new and expanded roles for NATO in order to maintain their control over Europe. We have seen that the Americans gave a very short shrift to a French request that a European head up NATO's southern sector. There is a movement toward redefining NATO in terms of intervention in areas such as the Middle East and the Third World. In other words, NATO, like the IMF is another instrument of a new colonialism.

Whatever the case, NATO is not only a large military bureaucracy. It has become a sort of superpower in itself, controlled by the United States, with membership of European States (and Canada) to sweeten the pill. These thus become client states of NATO without being directly or immediately defined as satellites of the United States. It also serves to disguise responsibility, making it possible, as was the case in the 1980s, to tell Europeans that the Americans insist on more nuclear weapons (cruise missiles, Pershing IIs) even as American taxpayers are told that it is the Europeans who insist on these policies. Something of the same dialectic is involved in the current question of NATO expansion. Some Europeans have presented it as an initiative on the part of

American hardliners such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, or as a result of the pressure of ethnic voters (Poles, Czechs) on the Clinton administration, even as some Americans have appeared reluctant but subject to pressure on the part of Europeans.

A Super Military Alliance

The ultimate objective is apparently to expand NATO eastward, which would create a military super-alliance dominated by the United States, ensure an indefinite extension of what Seymour Melman has called the permanent war economy,⁶⁵ reduce to trash such peacekeeping institutions as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and make the United Nations irrelevant. With its emphasis on military solutions to complex problems, NATO has created, and continues to maintain, a heavy burden on the countries of the alliance. As it functions, it constitutes nothing less than a new imperialism, whose rationale is that of the Cold War even as it prepares eventually to include the Russian Federation . . . "⁶⁶

It has been suggested that with the end of East-West confrontation and the eventual inclusion of Russia, the alliance's name might be changed to something like Pan-European Security Alliance.⁶⁷ Given the importance of symbolism in these matters, one wonders if such a change would be acceptable to the United States; it might symbolize a change in the balance of the alliance and its basic rationale. One might even envision an alliance headed by a Russian general. If the alliance is to survive, it must eventually come to something like this. It has now formalized criteria for admission which include "democracy, individual liberty, rule of law, free markets, democratic and civilian control over the military, resolution of ethnic disputes, environmental responsibility, and absence of border disputes with its neighbours" ⁶⁸ The inclusion of "democratic and civilian control over the military" in this list is surely ironic, since there is every indication that NATO itself is structured in such a way as to make it very nearly immune from any democratic control on the part of the people of member states:

European defence, it is envisaged, will not be under the control of the European Parliament. The proposal is that a European Commissioner for Defence would be appointed. Such an approach would decrease the democratic control of the military and increase secret and covert activities. Ironically, at the same time, countries participating in Partnership for Peace programmes are being urged to keep the military under democratic control. Perhaps it all depends on what is meant by democracy, i.e., the western economic system, or participation by the people in government?⁶⁹

The new and expanded NATO then appears to embody most of its original purposes:

- (1) to maintain and expand the American Empire
- (2) to support and expand its own political system
- (3) to keep the system firmly under American control
- (4) to prevent the emergence of any real alternatives to military solutions to international problems

It has also resolutely rejected any notion of nuclear disarmament except under the step-by-step system of the START agreements, which in effect guarantees that there will never be any full nuclear disarmament, only carefully staged reduction of ever-more-enhanced nuclear weapons, to say nothing of conventional weapons, communications equipment and training programmes for the military of new member states.

Nuclear Weapons and NATO

NATO in fact has no nuclear weapons. This is true in a sense. Such weapons are in fact controlled entirely by the member states, principally by the United States.⁷⁰ NATO refuses to rule out the first use of nuclear weapons, and may, in fact oblige new members to accept nuclear weapons in principle. One wonders where this places Canada? Are we also to be prepared to accept nuclear weapons in principle? As a member nation of NATO, it appears in fact that we do, whether we have them in our country or not.

This alone would be sufficient reason for Canada to withdraw from NATO. The Court Decision, by *affirming that nuclear weapons are subject to the humanitarian laws of war, had in effect outlawed these weapons.* It should be obvious to anyone that it is not possible actually to employ nuclear weapons and respect the humanitarian laws of war as these are commonly understood.

In addition, it should also be clear that NATO is an anachronism if one looks only at its ostensible purpose, that of defending Western Europe against possible Soviet aggression. In fact, the fundamental purpose was political:

... the United States, in the full splendour of its postwar power, was attempting to strengthen its political ties with, and influence over, Europe through the creation of common military institutions. Senator Connally succinctly phrased this in the Senate debate: "The Atlantic Pact is but the logical extension of the principle of the Monroe doctrine"⁷¹

Canada and NATO

Is there really any reason for Canada to remain in NATO? As an institution, NATO is committed to the continuance of the nuclear threat. It has pointedly ignored the decision of the World Court, and, in part because of its place in NATO, voted against resolutions based on that decision. The role and function of NATO can best be described as a spearhead for U.S. domination of Europe. It is a military institution that creates an atmosphere in which military solutions to complex problems are sought first. This was perhaps understandable fifty years ago. But the world has learned a lot about collective security in the past fifty years. Security is much more than a question of military power: it is a question of social, political, economic and legal human rights. The NATO vision of security is entirely too narrow, and the dominance of NATO may well constitute an impediment to the development of this larger conception of security. And it is for these reasons that Canada should resolve the contradictions created by membership in NATO -- and NORAD as well -- by withdrawing from the organization

ADDENDUM
by
ED SHAFFER

Jordan Bishop wrote the bulk of this paper in 1996 and 1997. Since that time, four interrelated events occurred:

- NATO officially changed its strategy
- NATO admitted three new countries
- NATO attacked the Republic of Yugoslavia
- NATO reaffirmed its nuclear policy

These events have more than confirmed his conclusion that the “role and function of NATO can best be described as a spearhead for U.S. domination of Europe.” At NATO’s 50th anniversary summit meeting, held in Washington in April 1999, it adopted a new strategy, which changed NATO into a spearhead for U.S. domination of the entire world.

One of the early harbingers of this change was an Op-Ed piece in appeared the *New York Times* of October 21, 1997, entitled “NATO's True Mission.” Its authors, former U. S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher and former U. S. Secretary of Defense, William Perry, pointing to the dilemma NATO has faced since the end of the Cold War stated:

One thing is clear. Neither the American public nor the citizenry of its allies will continue to support an alliance -- enlarged or unenlarged -- that appears to focus on nonexistent threats of aggression in Europe. For NATO to succeed, it must develop the ability to respond to today's security needs. ⁷²

In other words NATO’s continued existence depended on finding a new threat to displace that of the former Soviet Union. Elaborating on these new threats, they wrote:

The alliance needs to adapt its military strategy to today's reality: the danger to the security of its members is not primarily potential aggression to their collective territory, but threats to their collective interests beyond their territory. Shifting the alliance's emphasis from defense of members' territory to defense of common interests is the strategic imperative. These threats include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of oil, terrorism, genocidal violence and wars of aggression in other regions that threaten to create great disruption. To deal with such threats, alliance members need to have a way to rapidly form military coalitions that can accomplish goals beyond NATO territory.⁷³

The authors made no mention of the role of the United Nations in dealing with these problems. In a world with only one superpower, they apparently felt that there was no longer any need for the UN. NATO, under the tutelage of the U. S., was to become the world's arbiter of disputes.

NATO assumed this new role even before it officially changed its charter when it launched its attack on Yugoslavia in March 1999. NATO, without bothering to go to the UN and in violation of both the UN and its own charters, intervened in the civil war in Kosovo. It deliberately presented the Yugoslav government with a set of demands which it knew that no self-respecting government could ever accept.

These demands, which NATO never published, were listed in Appendix B of the Rambouillet accord. According to the Albanian Kosova Crisis Center, which published the text on its Web site, it stipulated, among other things that NATO personnel must have "free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access" to all of Yugoslavia, not just the province of Kosovo; that all NATO personnel "shall be immune" from arrest for all crimes they commit anywhere in Yugoslavia; and that NATO "the cost-free use of all Yugoslavian streets, airports and ports." Accession to these demands would have placed all Yugoslavia under a *de facto* foreign occupation.

Commenting on these demands, George Kenney, a former State Department Yugoslavia desk officer, wrote in the June 14 issue of the U. S. weekly, *The Nation* that:

An unimpeachable press source who regularly travels with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told this [writer] that, swearing reporters to deep-background confidentiality at the Rambouillet talks, a senior State Department official had bragged that the United States "deliberately set the bar higher than the Serbs could accept." The Serbs needed, according to the official, a little bombing to see reason.

Yugoslavia's surprisingly strong resistance to NATO's bombings raised serious concerns among U. S. and NATO leaders. Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr., a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressed these concerns when he stated that "if we do not achieve our goals in Kosovo, NATO is finished as an alliance."⁷⁴ What Biden was saying that Kosovo was the test case of NATO's new policy of imposing its diktats on the world by intervening in area in which it claims its "collective interests" are threatened. If NATO succeeds in Kosovo, it sends an unmistakable message to the rest of the world to obey or die. If NATO fails, it will have no credibility and might as well disband.

Though there is debate whether NATO won or lost in Kosovo, one thing is clear. If NATO is successful in its goals, it will transform the United Nations into a useless ornament.

NATO's new "Strategic Concept," adopted at its 50th anniversary summit meeting in Washington in April 1999, made this quite clear. Article 24, for instance, states:

Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind. ⁷⁵

No mention is made of bringing these problems to the United Nations even though the UN Charter, which all NATO members signed, says that is the proper venue for settling such disputes.

The Strategic Concept has another provision which, along with the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to membership, has serious implications to Russia and China. Paragraph 21 states:

The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance also constitutes a significant factor which the Alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained. ⁷⁶

There is considerable instability in Russia, one of the powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance, and in other parts of the former Soviet Union. There are now movements to revive the Soviet Union. If these movements succeed, will the Alliance claim that the “security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area” will be threatened? Will it use Kosovo as a precedent? This may not be as far-fetched as it seems. As Jordan Bishop has pointed out in his section, the Allies invaded the young Soviet Republic after the Bolshevik Revolution. Is it not conceivable that there could be a repeat performance but this time with cruise missiles, stealth bombers and nuclear weapons?

In this respect, the Strategic Concept not only ignores the UN but also the World Court decision and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which all NATO members acceded, by reaffirming NATO’s policy of nuclear deterrence. The first sentence of paragraph 63 stipulates:

.A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. ⁷⁷

As Jordan Bishop pointed out, NATO told Russia that it had no plans to base nuclear forces in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Paragraph 63, however, paves the way for such basing. If carried out, it would create more instability in Europe by stationing nuclear weapons closer to Russia than ever before.

NATO's new Strategic Concept is incompatible with the long-held stated aims of Canadian foreign policy - the strengthening of the United Nations and the abolition of nuclear weapons. It raises at least two important questions, similar to those posed by Bishop: (1) if wars, like the one against Yugoslavia, are needed to justify its existence, should it exist at all and (2) should Canada continue to be a member of this organization, whose goals are so incompatible with Canadian values? These are the questions that Canadians will have to answer.

END NOTES

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1. "Canada Reviewing Nuclear Weapons Policy.," *Globe & Mail*, 8 November 1996, p. A5
 2. *War and Peace Digest* (New York) vol. 5 n. 1, Feb/Mar 1997, p. 1
 3. See André Fontaine, "OTAN: un élargissement fort prudent" dans *Le Monde* (Paris) 18.01.1997 p. 18.
 4. Reuters, May 9, 1997
 5. NATO *itself* is a statement of cCold wWar thinking.
 6. See André Fontaine, *cit.*
 7. This is double-edged question. If they are as incompetent as some observers claim, it might simply mean that if they attempted a nuclear attack, no one could tell in advance where the warheads would land.
 8. See *Beyond the Cold War*, New York, Pantheon Books, 1982, p. 11.
 9. Cfr. "From Cold War to Cold Peace", in *Business Week*, n. 1015 (February 12, 1949), pp. 19-20.
 10. See Wolfe, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Menace*, Boston, South End Press, 1985.

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11. See Kai Bird, in *The Nation* (New York) Feb. 17, 1997, p. 26.
 12. See Douglas Roche, Q.C., "World Opinion against NATO's nukes", in *War and Peace Digest* (New York) vol. 5, n. 1 (Feb/Mar 1997) p. 4.
 13. Cfr. Toronto *Globe and Mail*, Feb. 3, 1997, p. 1.
 14. Mary Brennan, "Cooperation or Confrontation - Which way for Europe? *pro manuscripto*. March 1997.
 15. "The Holy Alliance," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, London, 1962, Vol. 11, p. 683
 16. "Statement by the President on NATO Expansion," The White House, May 14, 1997, p. 1
 17. VACLAV HAVEL, "NATO's Quality of Life," *The New York Times*, May 13, 1997, p. A15
 18. "The Holy Alliance," *op.cit.*
 19. See Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy. Hiroshima and Potsdam. The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power*. New York, Viking Penguin, 1985.
 20. JOSEPH ROTBLAT, "To neutralize the Nazis, I helped to build the Bomb," Vancouver Sun, October 21, 1995, p. A23
 21. *Ibid.*
 22. Mr. Churchill, who cited this number, should certainly have known better. U.S. staff estimates involved something like 250,000 *casualties*, of which perhaps 40,000 would have been deaths, in the very unlikely scenario of an invasion, which no one today believes would have taken place. Japanese leadership was more fearful of internal revolution than of an allied invasion.
 23. See the special edition of *Diplomatic History* (March, 1995).
 24. Cfr. Barton J. Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb and

the Japanese Surrender Missed Opportunities, Little-Known Near Disasters, and Modern Memory", in *Diplomatic History* 19 (1995) p. 262.

25. Doug Roche, "Canada, the World Court and Nato: a broken triangle. Background paper for seminar on the implications for Canadian Foreign Policy of the International Court of Justice Opinion on the Legality of the Use or Threatened Use of Nuclear Weapons." Ottawa, March 6-7, 1997. p. 5

26. On an earlier use of *deterrence*, see G.B. Shaw's short play, *Press Cuttings* (1912).

27. E.P., Thompson, *Beyond the Cold War. A New Approach to the Arms Race and Nuclear Annihilation*. New York, Pantheon Books, 1982, p. 3.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

32. *Ibid.*

33. See J. Bishop, "Re-running the 1939-45 Model", in *Policy Options* (Halifax, Nova Scotia) September 1987.

34. *New York Review of Books*, July 16, 1981.

35. *op. cit.*, p. 21.

36. Jacques Santer, "EU Security and Defence Policy", in *NATO Review* Nov. 1996. Cited by Mary Brennan, "Cooperation or Confrontation - Which way for Europe? (Pro-ms., p. 7)

37. Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War: 1945-1984* (fifth edition, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 1.

38. Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-1984* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 5th edition, 1985), p. 3.

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40. LaFeber, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

41. Alan Palmer, *The Lands between. A History of East-Central Europe since the Congress of Vienna*. London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1970, p. 139.

42. LaFeber, *cit.* p. 3

43. *cit.*, p. 4. See however Palmer, *op. cit.*, 137 ss. for a more detailed account of the emergence of these nations as independent nation-states.

44. See LaFeber, *cit.*, p. 4.

45. *ibid.*, p. 5.

46. *ibid.*, p. 6.

47. *The New York Times*, June 24, 1941. Cited by LaFeber, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

48. See Gar Alperovitz, *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb*, New York, vintage Books, 1995, *PASSIM*.

49. Edgar Snow, *Journey to the Beginning. A Personal View of Contemporary History* (New York, 1958) pp. 350-351. Cited by Alperovitz, *op. cit.*, 352-353.

50. Gar Alperovitz, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

51. Spaatz interview with Alfred Goldberg, May 19, 1965, p. 6, US Air Force Oral History Program, AFHRA, cited by Alperovitz, *op. cit.*, p.345.

52. Bonner Fellers, "Hirohito's Struggle to Surrender", in *Reader's Digest* (July, 1947), p. 93 (Cited by Alperovitz, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

53. LaFeber, *op. cit.*, p. 40. But see also Alperovitz, *op. cit.*, pp.284-290. The United States had failed to adhere to the Yalta agreement on reparations, which placed the Soviet Union in a difficult position. At the same time, given the situation in

Germany, the whole question of reparations became less than realistic.

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56. *ibid.*, p. 54.

57. *ibid.*, p. 62-63.

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62. David Morgan, letter dated 12 March 1997, citing *The (Toronto) Globe and Mail* for 25th February 1997: "Canada's Defence Costs to Jump."

63. *ibid.*

64. Cited by Morgan, *cit.*

65. See Seymour Melman, *The Permanent War Economy. American Capitalism in Decline*. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1974.

66. *Ibid* Center for Defence Information, *The Defense Monitor* (Washington, DC), February 1997, p. 5.

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71. Walter LaFeber, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

72. Warren Christopher and William J. Perry, "NATO's True Mission," *New York Times*, Op-Ed, October 21, 1997, p. A21

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75. NATO, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," Press Release NAC-S(99)65, 24 Apr. 1999, para. 24

76. *Ibid*, para 21

77. *Ibid*, para 63